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its determination, in the absence of more convincing evidence of
what the state law is, should be followed by the federal court."8
These decisions further advance the fundamental purpose of
the Erie decision. They represent another step in the removal of
judicial uncertainties attendant upon a duplex system of jurisprudence. The whole purpose of the Erie decision might be
thwarted if federal courts were free to choose their own rules of
decision whenever the highest court of the state has not spoken,
since the state is not necessarily without law on a subject merely
because its highest courts have not spoken. The federal courts
must now follow the rules of intermediate appellate courts of the
state, unless "convinced by other persuasive data that the highest
court of the state would decide otherwise. '
G.D.L.

LABOR LAw-NORRIS-LAGUARDIA ACT-APPLICATION TO ANTITRUST PROSECUTION OF LABOR UNIONs-Members of

two craft

unions, both affiliated with the American Federation of Labor,
disagreed over which was to perform certain work for their mutual employer, a brewing company dependent on interstate commerce for materials and a market. The dispute resulted in a strike,
picketing, and boycott whereby one union sought to force its
jurisdictional demands on the employer. Officials of the dissatisfied organization were indicted under the Sherman Act for combination and conspiracy in restraint of trade. Held, demurrers
denying that what was charged constituted a violation of the laws
of the United States were properly sustained. United States v.
Hutcheson, 61 S.Ct. 463, 85 L.Ed. 422 (1941).
The conclusion at which the Court arrived is another significant extension of the concept that labor should be relatively free
from legal restraint.' But the process of statutory interpretation
relied upon to sustain this result presents an interesting problem.
The Court's line of reasoning can be restated substantially as
8. 61 S.Ct. at 178.

9. West v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 61 S.Ct. 179, 183 (1940).
1. Compare Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093

(1940) (involving the right to picket); Apex Hosiery Mills v. Leader, 310 U.S.
469, 60 S.Ct. 982, 84 L.Ed. 1311 (1940) (dealing with a suit for triple damages
under the Sherman Act); American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 61 S.Ct.
568, 85 L.Ed. 513 (1941) (concerning the right to picket). Cf. Milk Wagon
Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 61 S.Ct. 552, 85 L.Ed. 497 (1941).
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follows: Section 20 of the Clayton Act 2 grants complete immunity
from all federal laws for certain labor activities. Whether the
conduct here involved is within the protection of this section
as defined and limited by earlier cases need not be considered,
because the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 4 although dealing explicitly
with the use of the injunction in labor disputes, outlines the
national policy in regard to labor unions, indicates what Congress
intended to accomplish by the earlier enactment, and expresses
Congressional disapproval of the decisions restricting the scope of
the Clayton Act. Reading the Clayton Act in the light of the interpretation which Congress has embodied in the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, the acts charged in the indictment are' exempted from the
Sherman Act by Section 20.
Mr. Justice Stone concurred in the result reached; but he
found in the case no occasion to consider the relation of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to the Clayton Act, since the conduct here
involved was not criminal under earlier interpretations of the
Clayton Act. Mr. Justice Roberts, joined in a dissent by Chief
Justice Hughes, regarded the conduct as being criminal under the
Sherman Act. He distrusted the interpretation of the Norris-LaGuardia Act because he viewed it as a novel and dangerous usurpation of legislative power by a process of construction never
heretofore indulged by the Supreme Court.
Ostensibly the purpose of the Norris-LaGuardia Act was simply to eliminate, so far as the federal courts are concerned, the
frequently misused' labor injunction. Since the basic guide of the
courts in statutory interpretation is the intention of the legislators,6 when a remedial statute, such as the Norris-LaGuardia Act,
2. 38 Stat. 730, 738 (1914), 29 U.S.C.A. § 52 (1927).
3. "No restraining order or injunction shall be granted by any court of
the United States ... in any case ... involving, or growing out of, a dispute
concerning terms or conditions of employment....
"And no such restraining order or injunction shall prohibit [here the act
enumerates certain types of activity] nor shall any of the acts specified in
this paragraphbe considered or held to be violations of any law of the United
States." (Italics supplied.) 38 Stat. 730, 738 (1914), 29 U.S.C.A. § 52 (1927).
4. 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C.A. 8H 101-115 (Supp. 1940).
5. On the practical effects of use of the labor injunctions, see Norris,
Injunctions in Labor Disputes (1932) 16 Marq. L. Rev. 151; Pepper, Injunctions
In Labor Disputes (1924) 49 A.B.A.Rep. 174; Witte, The Government in Labor
Disputes (1932) 111-113. Comments (1930) 24 Ill. L. Rev. 772, (1939) 8 Fordham
L. Rev. 237.
6. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 12 S.Ct. 511,
36 L.Ed. 226 (1892); Takao Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 43 S.Ct. 65,
67 L.Ed. 199 (1922). Maxwell, The Interpretation of Statutes (8 ed. 1937) 1;
Sutherland, Statutory Construction (2 ed. 1904) 696, § 364,
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is invoked as a rule for decision of a specific case, the courts will
7
consider the evil which the statute was designed to correct.
The Norris-LaGuardia Act was passed, in fulfillment of political campaign promises,8 to eliminate abuse of the injunction; it is
not believed that its original purpose was to relieve labor from
other forms of legal responsibility for its acts.9 The title of the
act 0 and its specific provisions 1 indicate that it is aimed solely
7. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 12 S.Ct. 511,
36 L.Ed. 226 (1892). Maxwell, op. cit. supra note 6, at 61; Sutherland, op. cit.
supra note 6, at 1074, § 583.
8. Both Democratic and Republican platforms for the 1932 presidential
campaigns contained planks expressing disfavor with the labor injunction. 75
Cong. Rec. 5462 (1932).
9. The report of the Senate Committee recommending passage of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act states: "It is not the intention of the bill to protect
anybody, whether he be employer or employee, from punishment for the commission of unlawful acts." Sen. Rep. 163, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1932) 19. The
minority report of the Senate Committee objects to the bill because "it would
repeal the anti-trust laws in part as to issuance of injunctions." (Italics supplied.) Id. at 9. "The bill has as its primary purpose the relief from certain
abuses growing out of the issuance of injunctions in labor cases." Id. at 14.
The entire report of the House of Representatives committee recommending
passage of the bill deals with injunctions, save for a mention of the Sherman
Act in connection with Section 3 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act involving
"yellow-dog" contracts. H.R.Rep. 689, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1932). The reports
of Congressional committees may be considered as indicative of the intention
of Congress. Blake v. National Banks, 90 U.S. 307, 23 L.Ed. 119 (1875); Binns v.
United States, 194 U.S. 486, 24 S.Ct. 816, 48 L.Ed. 1087 (1904); Helvering v.
New York Trust Co., 292 U.S. 455, 54 S.Ct. 806, 78 L.Ed. 1361 (1934). See Jones,
Extrinsic Aids in the Federal Courts (1940) 25 Iowa L. Rev. 737, 743. While
Congressional debates are inadmissible to indicate the intention of Congress
[United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 17 S.Ct. 540, 41
L.Ed. 1007 (1897). See Ten Broeck, Admissibility of Congressional Debates in
Statutory Construction by the United States Supreme Court (1937) 25 Calif.
L.Rev. 326.] The arguments of supporters of the bill indicate that they construed the bill as simply eliminating judgment in advance by means of injunction, leaving labor to its full penalty if it violated any federal laws. See,
for example, the remarks of Senator Blaine, 75 Cong. Rec. 4630 (1932);
Representative Dyer, id. at 5465, 5466; Representative Greenwood, id. at 5467;
Representative Celler, id. at 5487, 5490. See also Norris, supra note 5, at 165.
Even Mr. Justice (then Professor) Frankfurter did not think at the time
the bill was being argued for passage, that its effect extended beyond elimination of the injunction: "The measure . . . merely deals with most insistent
issues presented by the labor injunction as utilized by the federal courts."
Frankfurter and Greene, The Labor Injunction (1932) 226.
10. "An act to amend the Judicial Code and to define and limit the jurisdiction of courts sitting in equity, and for other purposes." 47 Stat. 70 (1932),
29 U.S.C.A. § 103 (Supp. 1940).
11. There are only three provisions which expressly have a broader application than to injunctions: the actions applicable to "yellow-dog" contracts
[47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C.A. § 103 (Supp. 1940)], the agent-principal relationship [47 Stat. 70, 71 (1932), 29 U.S.C.A. § 105 (Supp. 1940)], and the trial of
contempt cases [47 Stat. 70, 72, 73 (1932), 29 U.S.C.A. §H 111-112 (Supp. 1940)].
See Witte, The Federal Anti-Injunction Act (1932) 16 Minn. L. Rev. 638. The
title of an act is a guide to its meaning. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United
States, 143 U.S. 457, 12 S.Ct. 511, 36 L.Ed. 226 (1892); Caminetti v. United
States, 242 U.S. 470, 37 S.Ct. 192, 61 L.Ed. 442 (1917).
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at the labor injunction. Even if, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter states,
it was designed "to restore the broad purpose which Congress
thought it had formulated in the Clayton Act," it is doubtful that
the act was intended to free labor from all federal sanctions; for
there are vast differences in the policy involved, on the one hand,
in granting an immunity from injunction, and, on the other, in
12
conferring a general freedom from all forms of accountability.
Even if phrased as a direct amendment to the Clayton Act, the
Norris-LaGuardia Act would seem to affect the earlier statute
only as to its injunctive phases.
There is some precedent for reasoning by analogy from a
criminal statute in formulating a rule for decision of a civil case.
Where criminal acts have caused damage, there has been resort to
the statute for a standard of care for civil conduct, and a consequent finding of tort liability for the damages caused. 13 Within
broad limits judges are free to impose their own standards of conduct in torts cases, and in so doing they may borrow from legislative policy to any extent that they deem advisable. Likewise, the
courts have refused to be used as instruments for the enforcement
of contracts connected with criminal acts. 4 Where conduct is thus
proscribed as to the community as a whole it is easy to see why
public policy impels the courts to take such a stand. But safety
from injunction is merely freedom from an extraordinary civil
remedy. 15 And equity has long applied the rule that an injunction
will not issue merely to prevent violation of the criminal law, 16
although Mr. Justice Frankfurter considers forceful the argument
7
that what is non-enjoinable could not be criminal.1
The Supreme Court might easily have arrived at the same
result by following the path taken by Mr. Justice Stone in his
12. "Injunctions in labor disputes are merely the emergency brakes for
rare use and in case of sudden danger." Chief Justice Hughes, quoted with
approval in Frankfurter and Greene, op. cit. supra note 9, at 222.
13. Violation of criminal statutes may be held to create civil liability directly, or indirectly on the theories that violation is evidence of negligence
or negligence per se. Harper, A Treatise on the Law of Torts (1933) 187, § 78.
See Lowndes, Civil Liability by Criminal Legislation (1932) 16 Minn. L. Rev.
361; Schneider, Negligence by Violation of Law (1931) 11 B.U.L. Rev. 217;
Comment (1932) 32 Col. L. Rev. 712.
14. See Anson, Principles of the Law of Contracts (5 ed. 1932) 301 et seq.,
§ 246 et seq.; Gellhorn, Contracts and Public Policy (1935) 35 Col. L. Rev. 679;
6 Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts (1936) 4956, § 1750. Arts. 11,
12, La. Civil Code of 1870.
15. "Not government but 'government by injunction' has been challenged." Frankfurter and Greene, op. cit. supra note 9, at 200. "The injunc:tion ought never to become routine." Id. at 222.
16. Walsh, A Treatise on Equity (1930) 201, § 39.
17. 61 S.Ct. 463, 467, 85 L.Ed. 422, 426 (1941).
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concurring opinion.18 Several reasons may be advanced for its
failure to do so. The majority may have been searching for a
broad basis on which to deal with the charges which Assistant
Attorney-General Thurman Arnold proposes to bring against participants in certain labor practices. 19 In the next case the Court
may not find it easy to weave a thread of distinction and differentiation between the earlier decisions, as it did in Apex Hosiery
Mills v. Leader.20 Too, the Supreme Court has shown a determination to reconsider vital social problems without the hindering
effect of precedents. 21 Here was a convenient way to discard old
decisions without directly overruling established precedents. In
addition, the Court perhaps considered it time to officially pronounce the end of the era of "mutilating narrowness 22 in statutory construction. As a matter of statutory interpretation, the
decision appears to be "not free from doubt" 2 3-as stated by the
moderate Mr. Justice Stone. As a tour de force to enable the
Court to begin laying a fresh judicial foundation for reconciliation of labor activities and the Sherman Act, it is understandable.
A.B.R.

SUCCESSIONS - COLLATION-MANUAL GIFTS EXEMPT-Defendant, a daughter of decedent, had been given twelve shares of
homestead stock without consideration, but in accordance with
18. 61 S.Ct. at 468, 85 L.Ed. at 427.
19. See the Public Statement of the Department of Justice, issued in the
form of a letter, dated November 20, 1939, from Assistant Attorney-General
Thurman Arnold to the Secretary of the Central Labor Union of Indianapolis, titled: "Application of the Anti-Trust Laws to Labor Unions." N.Y.
Times, Nov. 20, 1939, p. 1, col. 4; id. at p. 12, cols. 1, 2. See also references to
this statement and pending cases in Arnold, The Bottlenecks of Business
(1940) 249; Boudin, The Sherman Act and Labor Disputes (1939) 39 Col. L.
Rev. 1283; McLaughlin, Bottlenecks (Union-Made Included) (1941) 8 U. of
Chi. L. Rev. 215, 218; Shulman, Labor and the Anti-Trust Laws (1940) 34 Ill.
L. Rev. 769, 779; Simons, For a Free-Market Liberalism (1941) 8 U. of Chi.
L. Rev. 202, 206.
20. 310 U.S. 469, 60 S.Ct. 982, 84 L.Ed. 1311 (1940), noted in (1940) 3
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of interest that

in

the

Apex

case

Mr.

Justice Stone suggested the broad application given the Norris-LaGuardia
Act In the Hutcheson case by citing the act in a footnote declaration that,
"Federal legislation aimed at protecting ... labor organizations . . . supports
the conclusion that Congress does not regard ... such combinations ... as ...
condemned by the Sherman Act." 310 U.S. at 504, n. 24, 60 S.Ct. at 998, 84 L.Ed.
at 1329.
21. See cases cited supra note 1.
22. "Such legislation must not be read In a spirit of mutilating narrowness." United States v. Hutcheson, 61 S.Ct. 463, 467, 85 L.Ed. 422, 426 (1941).
23. 61 S.Ct. at 468. 85 L.Ed. at 427.

